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Abstract
Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics
are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a
wide range of wireless network problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In
this paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless networks that have
been proven to be potential games are comprehensively discussed.
Index Terms
Potential game, game theory, radio resource management, channel assignment, transmission power
control
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless transmissions causes co-channel interference and channel
contention, which can be viewed as interactions among transceivers. Interactions among multiple
decision makers can be formulated and analyzed using a branch of applied mathematics called
game theory [61], [131]. Game-theoretic approaches have been applied to a wide range of
wireless communication technologies, including transmission power control for code division
multiple access (CDMA) cellular systems [153] and cognitive radios [132]. For a summary of
game-theoretic approaches to wireless networks, we refer the interested reader to [68], [91], [92],
[108], [168]. Application-specific surveys of cognitive radios and sensor networks can be found
in [64], [102], [160], [166], [178], [187].
In this paper, we focus on potential games [126], which form a class of strategic form games
with the following desirable properties:
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0TABLE I: Games discussed in this paper.
Section System model Strategy Payoff
V Fig. 1(b) Channel Interference power
VI Fig. 1(b) Channel SINR or Shannon capacity
VII Fig. 1(b) Channel Number of interference signals
VIII Figs. 1(c) and 1(d) Channel Interference power
IX Figs. 1(c) and 1(d) Channel SINR or Shannon capacity
X Fig. 1(e) Channel Number of interference signals
XI Fig. 1(e) Channel Successful access probability or throughput
XII Fig. 1(e) Transmission probability Successful access probability or throughput
XIII Fig. 1(a) Transmission power Throughput or Shannon capacity
XIV Fig. 1(c) Transmission power Connectivity
XV Fluid network Amount of traffic Congestion cost
XVI M/M/1 queue Arrival rate Trade-off between throughput and delay
XVII Mobile sensors Location Connectivity or coverage
XVIII Immobile sensors Channel Coverage
• The existence of a Nash equilibrium in potential games is guaranteed in many practical
situations [126] (Theorems 1 and 2 in this paper), but is not guaranteed for general strategic
form games. Other classes of games possessing Nash equilibria are summarized in [92, §2.2]
and [68, §3.4].
• Unilateral improvement dynamics in potential games with finite strategy sets are guaranteed
to converge to the Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps, i.e., they do not cycle [126]
(Theorem 4 in this paper). As a result, learning algorithms can be systematically designed.
A game that does not have these properties is discussed in Example 2 in Section II.
We provide an overview of problems in wireless networks that can be formulated in terms
of potential games. We also clarify the relations among games, and provide simpler proofs of
some known results. Problem-specific learning algorithms [92], [168] are beyond the scope of
this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Sections II, III, and IV, we introduce
strategic form games, potential games, and learning algorithms, respectively. We then discuss
various potential games in Sections V to XVIII, as shown in Table I. Finally, we provide a few
concluding remarks in Section XIX.
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1TX i TX j
RX
(a) Multiple-access
channel.
TX i TX j
RX i RX j
(b) TX-RX pairs
(Gij 6= Gji).
TX i TX j
(c) TXs (Gij = Gji). (d) Canonical network model
(Gij = Gji).
(e) Interference graph.
Fig. 1: System models. Straight blue lines represent communication channels of player i and red
dashed lines represent interference channels to player i.
The notation used here is shown in Table II. Unless the context indicates otherwise, sets
of strategies are denoted by calligraphic uppercase letters, e.g., Ai, strategies are denoted by
lowercase letters, e.g., ai ∈ Ai, and tuples of strategies are denoted by boldface lowercase
letters, e.g., a. Note that ai is a scalar variable when Ai is a set of scalars or indices, ai is a
vector variable when Ai is a set of vectors, and ai is a set variable when Ai is a collection of
sets.
We use R to denote the set of real numbers, R+ to denote the set of nonnegative real numbers,
R++ to denote the set of positive real numbers, and C to denote the set of complex numbers. The
cardinality of set A is denoted by |A|. The power set of A is denoted by 2A. Finally,
1condition
is the indicator function, which is one when condition is true and is zero otherwise.
We treat many system models, as shown in Fig. 1. In multiple-access channels, as shown in
Fig. 1(a), multiple transmitters (TXs/users/mobile stations/terminals) transmit signals to a single
receiver (RX/base station (BS)/access point (AP)). In Fig. 1(a), Gi represents the link gain from
TX i to the RX.
In a network model consisting of TX-RX pairs, as shown in Fig. 1(b), each TX i transmits
signals to RX i. In this case, Gij 6= Gji. In a network model consisting of TXs shown in
Fig. 1(c), each TX (BS/AP/transceiver/station/terminal/node) interferes with others. In this model,
Gij = Gji. A “canonical network model” [15], shown in Fig. 1(d), consists of clusters that are
spatially separated in order for Gij = Gji to hold. Note that these network models have been
discussed in terms of graph structure in [143].
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2We use ji to denote a directed link from TX i to TX j or cluster i to cluster j. Let interference
graph (I, E) be an undirected graph, where the set of vertices I = {1, 2, . . . } corresponds to TXs
or clusters, and i interferes with j if ji ∈ E , as shown in Fig. 1(e), i.e., E := { ji | GjiP > T }
where P is the transmission power level for every TX and T is a threshold of the received
power. Note that in undirected graph (I, E), ji ∈ E ⇔ ij ∈ E , for every {i, j} ⊂ I. We
denote the neighborhood of i in graph (I, E) by Ii := { j ∈ I \ {i} | ji ∈ E }. We also define
Icii (c) := { j ∈ Ii | cj = ci }, then, |I
ci
i (c)| =
∑
j∈Ii 1cj=ci
=
∑
j 6=i 1cj=ci 1ij∈E .
II. GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
We begin with the definition of a strategic form game and present an example of a game-
theoretic formulation of a simple channel selection problem. Moreover, we discuss other useful
concepts, such as the best response and Nash equilibrium. The analysis of Nash equilibria in the
channel selection example reveals the potential presence of cycles in best-response adjustments.
Definition 1: A strategic (or normal) form game is a triplet G := (I, (Ai)i∈I , (ui)i∈I), or simply
G := (I, (Ai), (ui)), where I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|} is a finite set of players (decision makers)1, Ai
is the set of strategies (or actions) for player i ∈ I, and ui :
∏
i∈I Ai → R is the payoff (or
utility) function of player i ∈ I that must be maximized.
If S ⊆ I, we denote the Cartesian product
∏
i∈S Ai by AS . If S = I, we simply write A to
denote AI , and
∑
i to denote
∑
i∈I . When S = I \ {i}, we let A−i denote AI\{i}, and
∑
j 6=i
denote
∑
j∈I\{i}. For ai ∈ Ai, aS = (ai)i∈S ∈ AS , a = (ai,a−i) = (a1, . . . , a|I|) ∈ A, and
a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , a|I|) ∈ A−i.
Example 1:
Consider a channel selection problem in the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b). Each
TX-RX pair is assumed to select its channel in a decentralized manner in order to minimize the
received interference power.
The channel selection problem can be formulated as a strategic form game G1 := (I, (Ci), (u1i)).
The elements of the game are as follows: the set of players I is the set of TX-RX pairs. The
strategy set for each pair i, Ci is the set of available channels. The received interference power
1Infinite player (or non-atomic) potential games introduced in [150], [151] are beyond the scope of this paper. Infinite player
potential games have been applied to BS selection games [158], [170].
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3TABLE II: Notation.
G Strategic form game
I Finite set of players, I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|}
If (a) := { i ∈ I | f ∈ ai }
Ai Set of strategies for player i ∈ I
A Strategy space,
∏
i∈I Ai
ui Payoff function for player i ∈ I
φ Potential function
BRi Best-response correspondence of player i
ai Strategy of player i, ai ∈ Ai
∆(Ai) Set of probability distributions over Ai
xi Mixed strategy, xi ∈ ∆(Ai)
x Mixed strategy profile, x ∈
∏
i
∆(Ai)
Gi Link gain between TX i and a single isolated RX in Fig. 1(a)
Gij Link gain between TX j and RX i; Gji 6= Gij in Fig. 1(b), and Gji = Gij in Figs. 1(c) and 1(d)
ji Directed link from i to j
E Set of edges in undirected graph
Ii := { j ∈ I \ {i} | ji ∈ E }. Neighborhood in graph (I, E)
Icii (c) := { j ∈ Ii | cj = ci }.
N Common noise power for every player
Ni Noise power at RX i
Ni(ci) Noise power at RX i in channel ci
Ii(c) Interference power at RX i at channel arrangement c
Ci Set of available channels for player i
ci (∈ Ci) Channel of player i
c := (ci)i∈I ∈
∏
i
Ci
Pi Set of available transmission power levels for player i
pi (∈ Pi) Transmission power level of player i as a strategy
p := (pi)i∈I ∈
∏
i
Pi
P Identical transmission power level for every player
Pi Transmission power level for player i as a constant
Γ Required signal-to-interference-plus-noise power ratio (SINR)
at RX i ∈ I is determined by a combination of channels c = (ci)i∈I ∈ C =
∏
i Ci, where
Ii(c) :=
∑
j 6=i
GijP 1cj=ci . (1)
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4Let −Ii(c) be the payoff function to be maximized, i.e.,
u1i(c) := −Ii(c) = −
∑
j 6=i
GijP 1cj=ci . (2)
Note that G1 was introduced in [140], and we further discuss it in Example 2.
Definition 2: The best-response correspondence2 (or simply, best response) BRi : A−i → 2Ai
of player i to strategy profile a−i is the correspondence
BRi(a−i)
:= { ai ∈ Ai | ui(ai,a−i) ≥ ui(a
′
i,a−i), ∀a
′
i ∈ Ai }, (3)
or equivalently, BRi(a−i) := argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai,a−i).
A fundamental solution concept for strategic form games is the Nash equilibrium:
Definition 3: A strategy profile a∗ = (a∗i ,a∗−i) ∈ A is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (or
simply a Nash equilibrium) of game (I, (Ai), (ui)) if
ui(a
∗
i ,a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(ai,a
∗
−i), (4)
for every i ∈ I and ai ∈ Ai; equivalently, a∗i ∈ BRi(a∗−i) for every i ∈ I. That is, a∗i is a
solution to the optimization problem maxai∈Ai ui(ai,a∗−i).
At the Nash equilibrium, no player can improve his/her payoff by adopting a different strategy
unilaterally; thus, no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium. The
Nash equilibrium is a proper solution concept; however, the existence of a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium is not necessarily guaranteed, as shown in the next example.
Example 2: Consider G1 and the arrangement shown in Fig. 2, i.e., I = {1, 2, 3}, Ci = {1, 2}
for every i, and G13 > G12, G21 > G23, and G32 > G313. The game does not have a Nash
equilibrium, i.e., for every channel allocation, at least one pair has an incentive to change his/her
channel. The details are as follows: when all players choose the same channel, e.g., (c1, c2, c3) =
(1, 1, 1), every player has an incentive to change his/her channel because BRi(c−i) = {2} for
all i; thus, it is not in Nash equilibrium. On the contrary, when two players choose the same
channel, and the third player chooses a different channel, e.g., (c1, c2, c3) = (1, 1, 2), as shown
2A correspondence is a set-valued function for which all image sets are non-empty, e.g, [92], [131].
3This setting is essentially the same as that used in [63], [121], [137, Example 4.17], [134].
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5Transmitter 1
Transmitter 2
Transmitter 3 Receiver 3
Receiver 2
Receiver 1
Transmitter 1
Transmitter 2
Transmitter 3 Receiver 3
Receiver 2
Receiver 1
(a) (b)
(c)(d)(e)(f)
Fig. 2: Arrangement used in Example 2. A cycle results from the best-response adjustment.
in Fig. 2(a), BR2(c−2) = {2}, i.e., pair 2 has an incentive to change its channel a2 from 1 to
2, and (4) does not hold. Because of the symmetry property of the arrangement in Fig. 2, every
strategy profile does not satisfy (4). Furthermore, the best-response channel adjustments, which
will be formally discussed in Section IV, cycle as (1, 1, 2), (1, 2, 2), (1, 2, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 1),
(2, 1, 2), and (1, 1, 2), as shown in Figs. 2(a-f).
The channel allocation game G1 is discussed further in Section V.
III. POTENTIAL GAMES
We state key definitions and properties of potential games in Section III-A, show how to
identify and design exact potential games in Sections III-B and III-C, and show how to identify
ordinal potential games in Section III-D.
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6A. Definitions and Properties of Potential Games
Monderer and Shapley [126] introduced the following classes of potential games4:
Definition 4: A strategic form game (I, (Ai), (ui)) is an exact potential game (EPG) if there
exists an exact potential function φ : A → R such that
ui(ai,a−i)− ui(a
′
i,a−i) = φ(ai,a−i)− φ(a
′
i,a−i), (5)
for every i ∈ I, ai, a′i ∈ Ai, and a−i ∈ A−i.
Definition 5: A strategic form game (I, (Ai), (ui)) is a weighted potential game (WPG) if
there exist a weighted potential function φ : A → R and a set of positive numbers {αi}i∈I such
that
ui(ai,a−i)− ui(a
′
i,a−i) = αi(φ(ai,a−i)− φ(a
′
i,a−i)), (6)
for every i ∈ I, ai, a′i ∈ Ai, and a−i ∈ A−i.
Definition 6: A strategic form game (I, (Ai), (ui)) is an ordinal potential game (OPG) if there
exists an ordinal potential function φ : A → R such that
sgn(ui(ai,a−i)− ui(a
′
i,a−i))
= sgn(φ(ai,a−i)− φ(a
′
i,a−i)), (7)
for every i ∈ I, ai, a′i ∈ Ai, and a−i ∈ A−i, where sgn(·) denotes the sign function.
Although the potential function φ is independent of the indices of the players, φ reflects any
unilateral change in any payoff function ui for every player i.
Since an EPG is a WPG and a WPG is an OPG [126], [177], the following properties of
OPGs are satisfied by EPGs and WPGs.
Theorem 1 (Existence in finite OPGs): Every OPG with finite strategy sets possesses at least
one Nash equilibrium [126, Corollary 2.2].
Theorem 2 (Existence in infinite OPGs): In the case of infinite strategy sets, every OPG with
compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions possesses at least one Nash equilibrium
[126, Lemma 4.3].
4There are a variety of generalized concepts of potential games, e.g., generalized ordinal potential games [126], best-response
potential games [177], pseudo-potential games [56], near-potential games [28], [29], and state-based potential games [114].
Applications of these games are beyond the scope of this paper.
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7Theorem 3 (Uniqueness): Every OPG with a compact and convex strategy space, and a strictly
concave and continuously differentiable potential function possesses a unique Nash equilibrium
[138, Theorem 2], [154].
The most important property of potential games is acyclicity, which is also referred to as the
finite improvement property.
Definition 7 (Finite improvement property [126]): A path in (I, (Ai), (ui)) is a sequence
(a[0],a[1], . . .) such that for every integer k ≥ 1, there exists a unique player i such that
ai[k] 6= ai[k−1] ∈ Ai while a−i[k] = a−i[k−1]. (a[0],a[1], . . .) is an improvement path if, for
every k ≥ 1, ui(a[k]) > ui(a[k−1]), where i is the unique deviator at step k. (I, (Ai), (ui)) has
the finite improvement property (FIP) if every improvement path is finite.
Theorem 4: Every OPG with finite strategy sets has the FIP [126, Lemma 2.3]; that is, unilateral
improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of
steps.
B. Identification of Exact Potential Games
The definition of an EPG utilizes a potential function (5). Sometimes, however, it is beneficial
to know if a given game is an EPG independently of its potential function. The following
properties of EPGs and classes of games known to be EPGs are useful for the identification
and derivation of potential functions. Note that each EPG has a unique exact potential function
except for an additive constant [126, Lemma 2.7].
Theorem 5: Let (I, (Ai), (ui)) be a strategic form game where strategy sets Ai are intervals
of real numbers and payoff functions ui are twice continuously differentiable. Then, the game
is an EPG if and only if
∂2ui(a)
∂ai ∂aj
=
∂2uj(a)
∂ai ∂aj
, (8)
for every i, j ∈ I [126, Theorem 4.5].
Theorem 6: Let (I, (Ai), (ui,1)) and (I, (Ai), (ui,2)) be EPGs with potential functions φ1(a)
and φ2(a), respectively. Furthermore, let α, β ∈ R. Then, (I, (Ai), (αui,1 + βui,2)) is an EPG
with potential function αφ1(a) + βφ2(a) [59].
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81) Coordination-dummy Games: If ui(a) = u(a) for all i ∈ I, where u : A → R, the game
(I, (Ai), (u)) is called a coordination game5 or an identical interest game, and u is called a
coordination function [59].
If ui(a) = di(a−i) for all i ∈ I, where di : A−i → R, the game (I, (Ai), (di)) is called a
dummy game, and di is called a dummy function [59].
If ui(a) = si(ai) for all i ∈ I, where si : Ai → R, the game (I, (Ai), (si)) is called a
self-motivated game, and si is called a self-motivated function [133].
Theorem 7: (I, (Ai), (ui)) is an EPG if and only if there exist functions u : A → R and
di : A−i → R such that
ui(ai,a−i) = u(ai,a−i) + di(a−i), (9)
for every i ∈ I [59], [163]. This game is said to be a coordination-dummy game. The potential
function of this game is φ(a) = u(a).
Example 3: From Theorem 7, any identical interest game is an EPG. Almost all games found
in studies applying identical interest games [19], [27], [55], [74], [107], [142], [165] have the
form of game G2 := (I, (Ai), (u2i)), where
u2i(a) :=
∑
j
fj(a), (10)
for every i ∈ I and fj(a) is a performance indicator of player j, e.g., fj(a) is the individual
throughput and u2i(a) is the aggregated throughput of all players [165]. Note that in most of
these works, G2 is used for comparison with other games.
Example 4: Closely related to G2, the form of game G3 with payoff
u3i(a) := fi(ai,aIi) +
∑
j∈Ii
fj(aj ,aIj ), (11)
where fi : Ai×AIi → R, is found in many scenarios: data stream control in multiple-input and
multiple-output (MIMO) [14], channel assignment [188], joint power, channel and BS assignment
[162], joint power and user scheduling [206], BS selection [54], and BS sleeping [208]. Note
that G3 is not an identical interest game, but can be seen as G2 on graphs, where the performance
indicator of player i is a function of strategies of its neighbors, i.e., fi : Ai×AIi → R, and the
5The term “coordination game” is also used to describe games where players receive benefits when they choose the same
strategy [47].
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9sum of the performance indicators of player i and neighbors Ii is set for the payoff function of
player i. It can be easily proved that G3 is an EPG with potential
φ3(a) =
∑
i
fi(ai,aIi). (12)
2) Bilateral Symmetric Interaction Games: A strategic form game G4 := (I, (Ai), (u4i)) is
called a bilateral symmetric interaction (BSI) game if there exist functions wij : Ai × Aj → R
and si : Ai → R such that
u4i(a) =
∑
j 6=i
wij(ai, aj)− si(ai), (13)
where wij(ai, aj) = wji(aj, ai) for every (ai, aj) ∈ Ai ×Aj [174].
Theorem 8 ( [174]): A BSI game G4 is an EPG with potential function6
φ4(a) =
1
2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
wij(ai, aj)−
∑
i
si(ai)
=
∑
i<j
wij(ai, aj)−
∑
i
si(ai). (14)
Example 5: Consider a quasi-Cournot game G5 := (I, (Ai), (u5i)) with a linear inverse
demand function, where each player i ∈ I produces a homogeneous product and determines the
output. Let Ai = R++ be a set of possible outputs. The payoff function of player i is defined
by
u5i(a) :=
(
α− β
∑
j aj
)
ai − costi(ai), (15)
where α, β > 0 and costi : Ai → R is a differentiable cost function. Since
u5i(a) = αai − βai
2 − costi(ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
self-motivated function
− β
∑
j 6=i aj ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
BSI
, (16)
G5 is an EPG with potential
φ5(a) = α
∑
i ai − β
∑
i ai
2 −
∑
i ci(ai)− β
∑
i<j ai aj (17)
[163]. Further discussion can be found in [126], [174].
6∑
i<j
=
∑
{i,j}⊆I =
∑|I|
i=1
∑|I|
j=i+1
.
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3) Interaction Potential:
Theorem 9 ( [174]): A normal form game G6 := (I, (Ai), (u6i)) is an EPG if and only if
there exists a function {ΦS | ΦS : AS → R,S ⊆ I } (called an interaction potential) such that
u6i(a) =
∑
S⊆I:i∈S
ΦS(aS), (18)
for every a ∈ A and i ∈ I. The potential function is
φ6(a) =
∑
S⊆I
ΦS(aS). (19)
4) Congestion Games: In congestion games (CGs), the payoff for using a resource (e.g., a
channel or a facility) is a function of the number of players using the same resource. More
precisely, CGs are defined as follows:
In the congestion model proposed by Rosenthal [149], each player i uses a subset ai of common
resources F , and receives resource-specific payoff wf(|If (a)|) from resource f ∈ ai according to
the number of players using resource f . Here, wf : {1, . . . , |I|} → R, If (a) := { i ∈ I | f ∈ ai }
represents the set of players that use resource f . Then, |If(a)| =
∑
i 1f∈ai .
A strategic form game G7 := (I, (Ai), (u7i)) associated with a congestion model, where
Ai ⊆ 2
F and
u7i(a) :=
∑
f∈ai
wf(|I
f (a)|), (20)
is called a CG. Note that Ai is a collection of subsets of F and is not a set. Moreover, ai ∈ Ai
is a set, not a scalar quantity. Note that a CG where the strategy of every player is a singleton,
i.e., Ai ⊆ F and u7i(a) = wai(|Iai(a)|) is called a singleton CG.
Theorem 10: A CG G7 is an EPG with potential function
φ7(a) =
∑
f∈∪iai

|If(a)|∑
k=1
wf (k)

 , (21)
[126, Theorem 3.1] [149]. Furthermore, every EPG with finite strategy sets has an equivalent
CG [126, Theorem 3.2].
Note that generalized CGs do not necessarily possess potential functions. For generalized CGs
with potential, we refer the interested reader to [1], [120]. It was proved that CGs with player-
specific payoff functions [125], and those with resource-specific payoff functions and player-
specific constants [120], have potential. CGs with linear payoff function on undirected/directed
graphs has been discussed in [20].
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C. Design of Payoff Functions
In some scenarios, we can design payoff functions and assign them to players to ensure that
the game is an EPG. Such approach is often applied in the context of cooperative control [115].
These design methodologies can be used when we want to derive payoff functions from a given
global objective so that the game with the designed payoff functions is an EPG with the global
objective as the potential function. If the global objective is in the form of (19), we can derive
payoff functions by using (18).
Otherwise, we can utilize many design rules: the equally shared rule, marginal contribution,
and the Shapley values [159], [174]. Since Marden and Wierman [118] have already summarized
these rules, we only present marginal contribution here.
Marginal contribution, or the wonderful life utility (WLU) [182], is the following payoff
function derived from the potential function:
ui(a) = φ(a)− φ(a−i), (22)
where φ(a−i) is the value of the potential function in the absence of player i. The game with
the WLU is an EPG with potential function φ [118].
When the potential function for each player is represented as the sum of functions fi : A → R,
i.e., φ(a) =
∑
j fj(a) and φ(a−i) =
∑
j 6=i fj(a−i), the WLU (22) can be written as
ui(a) =
∑
j fj(a)−
∑
j 6=i fj(a−i)
= fi(a)−
∑
j 6=i(fj(a−i)− fj(a)), (23)
where fj(a−i)− fj(a) represents the loss to player j resulting from player i’s participation.
Example 6 (Consensus game): In the consensus problem [173], each player i adjusts ai and
tries to reach a1 = a2 = · · · = a|I|.
Marden et al. [115] considered the global objective
φ8(a) := −
1
2
∑
i
∑
j∈Ii
‖ai − aj‖, (24)
and proposed using the WLU
u8i(a) := −
∑
j∈Ii
‖ai − aj‖ =
∑
j 6=i
‖ai − aj‖1ij∈E . (25)
Since game G8 := (I, (Ai), (u8i)) is a BSI game with wij(ai, aj) = −‖ai − aj‖1ij∈E , G8 is
confirmed to be an EPG.
October 18, 2018 DRAFT
12
D. Identification of Ordinal Potential Games
In contrast to EPGs, OPGs have many ordinal potential functions [126].
Theorem 11: Consider the game (I, (Ai), (ui)). If there exists a strictly increasing transfor-
mation fi : R → R for every i ∈ I such that game (I, (Ai), (fi(ui))) is an OPG, the original
game (I, (Ai), (ui)) is an OPG with the same potential function [133].
IV. LEARNING ALGORITHMS
A variety of learning algorithms are available to facilitate the convergence of potential games to
Nash equilibrium, e.g., myopic best response, fictitious play, reinforcement learning, and spatial
adaptive play. Unfortunately, there are no general dynamics that are guaranteed to converge
to a Nash equilibrium for a wide class of games [71]. Since Lasaulce et al. [92, Sections 5
and 6] comprehensively summarized these learning algorithms and their sufficient conditions
for convergence for various classes of games (including potential games), we present only two
frequently used algorithms.
Definition 8: Best-response dynamics refers to the following update rule: At each step k,
player i ∈ I unilaterally changes his/her strategy from ai[k] to his/her best response a−i[k]; in
particular,
ai[k + 1] ∈ BRi(a−i[k]). (26)
The other players choose the same strategy, i.e., a−i[k + 1] = a−i[k].
Note that while the term “best-response dynamics” was introduced by Matsui [119], it has
many representations depending on the type of game. We also note that best-response dynamics
may converge to sub-optimal Nash equilibria. By contrast, the following spatial adaptive play
can converge to the optimal Nash equilibrium. To be precise, it maximizes the potential function
with arbitrarily high probability.
Definition 9: Consider a game with a finite number of strategy sets. Log-linear learning [22],
spatial adaptive play [198], and logit-response dynamics [5] refer to the following update rule: At
each step k, a player i ∈ I unilaterally changes his/her strategy from ai[k] to ai with probability
xi ∈ ∆(Ai) according to the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution
xi(ai | a−i[k]) =
exp[βui(ai,a−i[k])]∑
a′i∈Ai
exp [βui(a′i,a−i[k])]
, (27)
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where β (0 < β <∞) is related to the (inverse) temperature in an analogy to statistical physics.
Note that in the limit β →∞, the spatial adaptive play approaches the best-response dynamics.
Note that (27) is the solution to the following approximated maximization problem:
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai,a−i) = max
xi(ai)
∑
ai∈Ai
xi(ai) ui(ai,a−i)
≈ max
xi(ai)
[∑
ai∈Ai
xi(ai) ui(ai,a−i)−
1
β
∑
ai∈Ai
xi(ai) log xi(ai)
]
, (28)
which is called a perturbed payoff, where
∑
ai∈Ai
xi(ai) log xi(ai) is the entropy function. The
derivation of (27) from (28) can be found in [37].
Theorem 12 ( [22], [198]): In the finite EPG (I, (Ai), (ui)) with potential function φ, the
spatial adaptive play has the unique stationary distribution of strategy profile x ∈ ∆(A), where
x(a) =
exp [βφ(a)]∑
a∈A exp [βφ(a)]
, (29)
i.e., it is also the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution.
Further discussion can be found in [15], [117].
V. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO MANAGE RECEIVED AND GENERATED INTERFERENCE
POWER IN TX-RX PAIR MODEL
In the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b), Nie and Comaniciu [140] pointed out that
the channel selection game G1 introduced in Section II was not an EPG. Note that the payoff
function of G1 is the negated sum of received interference from neighboring TXs. To ensure that
the channel selection game is an EPG, they considered the channel selection game G9, whose
payoff function was the negated sum of the received interference from neighboring TXs, and
generated interference to neighboring RXs, i.e.,
u9i(c) := −
∑
j 6=i
(GijPj +GjiPi)1cj=ci . (30)
Since G9 is a BSI game with wij(ci, cj) = −(GijPj +GjiPi)1cj=ci , it is an EPG with potential
φ9(c) = −
∑
i
Ii(c) = −
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
GijPj 1cj=ci, (31)
which corresponds to the negated sum of received interference in the entire network. Note that
in order to evaluate (30), each pair i needs to estimate or share the values of the generated
interference to neighboring RXs, GjiPi 1cj=ci .
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Concurrently with the above, Kauffmann et al. [82] discussed the following potential function
φ10(c), which includes RX-specific noise power Ni(ci), and derived a payoff function using
Theorem 9,
φ10(c) := −
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
GijPj 1cj=ci −
∑
i
Ni(ci), (32)
u10i(c) = −
∑
j 6=i
(GijPj +GjiPi)1cj=ci −Ni(ci). (33)
To enable multi-channel allocation, e.g., orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA)
subcarrier allocation or resource block allocation, La et al. [88] discussed a modification of G9
suitable for multi-channel allocation.
In contrast to unidirectional links assumed in the TX-RX pair model, Uykan and Ja¨ntti
[175], [176] discussed a channel assignment problem for bidirectional links and proposed a
joint transmission order and channel assignment algorithm.
A. Joint Transmission Power and Channel Allocation
Nie et al. [141] showed that the joint channel selection and power control game with payoff
function
u11i(p, c) := −
∑
j 6=i
(Gijpj +Gjipi)1ci=cj (34)
is an EPG. Because the best response in G11 results in the minimum transmission power level,
Bloem et al. [21] proposed adding terms α log(1 + Giipi) + β/pi to (34) to account for the
achievable data rate and consumed power. Note that these terms are self-motivated functions,
and the game with the modified payoff function is still an EPG.
As another type of joint assignment, a preliminary beamform pattern setting followed by
channel allocation was discussed in [203].
B. Primary-secondary Scenario and Heterogeneous Networks
To manage interference in primary-secondary systems, Bloem et al. [21] proposed adding
terms related to the received and generated interferences from and to the primary user. They
also proposed adding cost terms related to payoff function (34). In particular, they discussed a
Stackelberg game [131], where the primary user was the leader and the secondary users were
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followers. Giupponi and Ibars discussed overlay cognitive networks [66] and heterogeneous
OFDMA networks [67]. Mustika et al. [129] took a similar approach to prioritize users.
Uplinks of heterogeneous OFDMA cellular systems with femtocells were discussed in [130],
whereas downlinks of OFDMA cellular systems, where each BS transmits to several mobile
stations, were discussed in [89], [90]. OFDMA relay networks were considered in [96]. Further
discussion can be found in [76]. Joint BS/AP selection and channel selection problems were
discussed in [48].
VI. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE SINR AND THROUGHPUT IN TX-RX PAIR
MODEL
In the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b), the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
at RX i is given by
GiiPi
Ni + Ii(c)
=
GiiPi
Ni +
∑
j 6=iGijPj 1cj=ci
=: SINRi(c). (35)
Menon et al. [122] pointed out that there may be no Nash equilibrium in the channel selection
game (I, (Ci), (SINRi)).
Instead, they proposed using the sum of the inverse SINR, defined by
u12i(c) := −
1
SINRi(c)
−
∑
j 6=i
GjiPi
GjjPj
1cj=ci, (36)
as the payoff function. Similar to G9, G12 := (I, (Ci), (u12i)) is a BSI game with wij(ci, cj) =
−[(GijPj/GiiPi) + (GjiPi/GjjPj)]1cj=ci . Thus, G12 is an EPG with potential
φ12(c) = −
∑
i
1
SINRi(c)
, (37)
i.e., the sum of the inverse SINR in the network.
Note that the above expression is a single carrier version of orthogonal channel selection.
Menon et al. [122] discussed a waveform adaptation version of G12 that can be applied to
codeword selection in non-orthogonal code division multiple access (CDMA), and Buzzi et
al. [24] further discussed waveform adaptation. Buzzi et al. [23] also discussed an OFDMA
subcarrier allocation version of G12. Cai et al. [25] discussed joint transmission power and
channel assignment utilizing the payoff function (36) of G12.
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Ga´llego et al. [63] proposed using the network throughput of joint power and channel assign-
ment, ∑
i
1SINRi(p,c)≥Γ Bci log (1 + SINRi(p, c)) , (38)
as potential, where Bci is the bandwidth of channel ci, and Γ is the required SINR. It may have
been difficult to derive a simple payoff function, and they thus proposed the WLU (23) of (38).
VII. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO MANAGE THE NUMBER OF INTERFERENCE SIGNALS IN
TX-RX PAIR MODEL
Yu et al. [199] and Chen et al. [36] considered sensor networks where each RX (sink) receives
messages from multiple TXs (sensors). They proved that a channel selection that minimizes the
number of received and generated interference signals is an EPG, where the potential is the
number of total interference signals. Note that the average number of retries is approximately
proportional to the number of received interference signals when the probability that the messages
are transmitted is very small, as in sensor networks.
A simpler and related form of (30) is detailed in the following discussion. To reduce the
information exchange required to evaluate (30), Yamamoto et al. [195] proposed using the
number of received and generated interference sources as the payoff function, where the received
interference power is greater than a given threshold T , i.e.,
u13i(c) := −
∑
j 6=i
(
1GijPj>T +1GjiPi>T
)
1cj=ci . (39)
This model is sometimes referred to as a “binary” interference model [110] in comparison
with a “physical” interference model. Because G13 := (I, (Ci), (u13i)) is a BSI game with
wij(ci, cj) = −(1GijPj>T +1GjiPi>T )1cj=ci , G13 is an EPG. When we consider a directed graph,
where edges between TX j and RX i indicate GijPj > T , we denote TX i’s neighboring RXs
by Ri := { j ∈ I | j 6= i and ji ∈ E }, and RX i’s neighboring TXs by Ti := { j ∈ I | j 6=
i and ij ∈ E }. Using these expressions, (39) can be rewritten to
u13i(c) = −
∑
j 6=i
(
1ij∈E +1ji∈E)1cj=ci
= −
∑
j∈Ti
1cj=ci −
∑
j∈Ri
1cj=ci . (40)
Yang et al. [196] discussed a multi-channel version of G13.
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VIII. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO MANAGE RECEIVED INTERFERENCE POWER IN TX
NETWORK MODEL
A. Identical Transmission Power Levels
In Section V, channel allocation games in the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b) are
discussed. Neel et al. [135], [136] considered a different channel allocation game typically
applied to channel allocation for APs in the wireless local area networks (WLANs) shown in
Fig. 1(c), where each TX i ∈ I selects a channel ci ∈ Ci to minimize the interference from other
TXs, i.e.,
u14i(c) := −Ii(c) := −
∑
j 6=i
GijP 1ci=cj , (41)
where P is the common transmission power level for every TX. Note that Gij = Gji in this
scenario, whereas Gij 6= Gji in the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b). Moreover, note that
interference from stations other than the TXs is not taken into account in the payoff function.
In addition to the TX network model, channel selection can be applied to the canonical network
model shown in Fig. 1(d) [15].
Because G14 is a BSI game where wij(ci, cj) = −GijP 1ci=cj , it is an EPG with potential
φ14(c) = −
1
2
∑
i
Ii(c), (42)
which corresponds to the aggregated interference power among TXs. Neel et al. pointed out that
other symmetric interference functions, e.g., max{B − |ci− cj|, 0}/B, where B is the common
bandwidth for every channel, can be used instead of
1ci=cj in (41).
Kauffmann et al. [82] discussed essentially the same problem. However, they considered
player-specific noise, and derived (41) by substituting Gij = Gji and Pi = Pj = P into (33).
Compared with the payoff function (30), (41) can be evaluated with only local information
available at each TX; however, the transmission power levels of all TXs need to be identical.
We further discuss this requirement in Section VIII-B.
Liu and Wu [105] reformulated the game represented by (41) as a CG by introducing virtual
resources. Further discussion can be found in [93].
October 18, 2018 DRAFT
18
B. Non-identical Transmission Power Levels
To avoid the requirement of identical transmission power levels in (41), Neel [134] proposed
using the product of (constant) transmission power level Pi and interference Ii(c) as the payoff
function, i.e.,
u15i(c) := −PiIi(c) = −Pi
∑
j 6=i
GijPj 1cj=ci . (43)
Because G15 is a BSI game with wij = −PiGijPj 1cj=ci , G15 is an EPG with
φ15(c) = −
1
2
∑
i
Pi
∑
j 6=i
GijPj 1cj=ci . (44)
Note that this form of payoff functions was provided by Menon et al. [123] in the context of
waveform adaptations. This game under frequency-selective channels was discussed by Wu et
al. [184].
The relationship between (43) and its exact potential function (44) implies that the game G16
with payoff function
u16i(c) := −Ii(c) = −
∑
j 6=i
GijPj 1cj=ci (45)
is a WPG with potential function φ15(c) and αi = 1/Pi in (6), i.e., the identical transmission
power level required in (41) is not necessarily required for the game to have the FIP. This was
made clear by Bahramian et al. [17] and Babadi et al. [15].
As extensions, in [179], the interference management game G17 on graph structures with the
following payoff function was discussed:
u17i(c) := −Pi
∑
i∈Ii
GijPj 1cj=ci
= −Pi
∑
i
GijPj 1cj=ci 1ji∈E . (46)
[185], [210] proposed using the expected value of interference in order to manage fluctuating
interference. Zheng [207] treated dynamical on-off according to traffic variations in G16.
IX. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE SINR AND CAPACITY IN TX NETWORK MODEL
Menon et al. [123] showed that a waveform adaptation game where the payoff function is
the SINR or the mean-squared error at the RX is an OPG. Chen and Huang [40] showed that a
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channel allocation game in the TX network model shown in Fig. 1(c), or in the canonical network
model shown in Fig. 1(d), where the payoff function is the SINR or a Shannon capacity, is an
OPG. Here, we provide a derivation in the form of channel allocation according to the derivation
provided in [123]. A channel selection game G18 with payoff function
u18i(c) := −Pi[Ni(ci) + Ii(c)] (47)
is an EPG with potential
φ18(c) = −
∑
i
PiNi(ci)−
1
2
∑
i
PiIi(c). (48)
Because Pi is a constant in (47), by Theorem 11, G19 with payoff
u19i(c) :=
−GiiPi
2
u18i(c)
=
GiiPi
Ni(ci) + Ii(c)
(49)
is an OPG with potential φ18(c). As a result, once again using Theorem 11, G20 with payoff
u20i(c) := B log (1 + u19i(c))
= B log
(
1 +
GiiPi
Ni(ci) + Ii(c)
)
(50)
is an OPG with potential φ18(c). Xu et al. [191] further discuss G20, where the active TX set
can be stochastically changed.
A quite relevant discussion was conducted by Song et al. [165]. They discussed a joint
transmission power and channel assignment game G21 to maximize throughput:
u21i(p, c) := R
(
1 +
Giipi
Ni(ci) + Ii(p, c)
)
, (51)
where R : R→ R represents throughput depending on SINR. They pointed out that since each
user would set the maximum transmission power at a Nash equilibrium, G21 is equivalent to
the channel selection game G14. Further discussion on joint transmission power and channel
assignment can be found in [109].
X. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO MANAGE THE NUMBER OF INTERFERENCE SIGNALS IN
INTERFERENCE GRAPH
For the interference graph (I, E) shown in Fig. 1(e), Xu et al. [188] proposed using the number
of neighbors that select the same channel as the payoff function, i.e.,
u22i(c) := −
∑
j∈Ii
1cj=ci . (52)
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We would like to point out that (52) can be reformulated to
u22i(c) = −
∑
j 6=i
1cj=ci 1ij∈E , (53)
i.e., G22 is a BSI game with wij(ci, cj) = −1cj=ci 1ij∈E . Thus G22 is an EPG. Note that this is
a special case of singleton CGs on graphs discussed in Section XI-A.
As variations of G22, Xu et al. [193] discussed the impact of partially overlapped channels.
Yuan et al. [200] discussed the variable-bandwidth channel allocation problem. Zheng et al.
[209] took into account stochastic channel access according to the carrier sense multiple access
(CSMA) protocol. Xu et al. [190] discussed a multi-channel version of G22.
Liu et al. [106] discussed a common control channel assignment problem for cognitive radios,
and proposed using
∑
j 6=i 1cj=ci for the payoff function so that every player chooses the same
channel. This game is similar to the consensus game G8.
XI. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE THROUGHPUT IN COLLISION CHANNELS
Channels can be viewed as common resources in the congestion model introduced in Section
III-B4. In general, throughput when using a channel depends only on the number of stations
that select the relevant channel. A CG formulation is thus frequently used for channel selection
problems. Altman et al. [9] formulated a multi-channel selection game in a single collision
domain as a CG. Based on a CG formulation, channel selections by secondary stations were
discussed in [80], [189]. A channel selection problem in multiple collision domains was discussed
in [192]. Iellamo et al. [78] used numerically evaluated successful access probabilities depending
on the number of stations in CSMA/CA as payoff functions.
Here, we discuss channel selection problems in interference graph (I, E), where each node
i ∈ I attempts to adjust its channel ci to maximize its successful access probability or throughput.
A. Slotted ALOHA
Consider collision channels shared using slotted ALOHA. Each node i adjusts its channel to
avoid simultaneous transmissions on the same channel because these result in collisions. In this
case, when one node exclusively chooses a channel, the node can transmit without collisions.
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Thus, the following payoff function captures the benefit of nodes:
u23i(c) :=


1 if |Icii | = 0,
0 otherwise.
(54)
G23 is a singleton CG on graphs, and Thomas et al. [169] showed that G23 is an OPG7.
Consider that each node has a transmission probability Xi (0 < Xi < 1). Chen and Huang
[41] proposed using the logarithm of successful access probability,
u24i(c) := log
[
Xi
∏
j∈I
ci
i
(1−Xj)
]
(55)
and proved that G24 is a WPG. Here, we provide a different proof. When we consider
u25i(c) := − log(1−Xi) · u24i(c) (56)
= − log(1−Xi) log
[
Xi
∏
j 6=i(1−Xj)
1cj=ci 1ij∈E
]
= − log(1−Xi) log(Xi)
− log(1−Xi)
∑
j 6=i 1cj=ci 1ij∈E log(1−Xj),
G25 is a BSI game with wij(ci, cj) = − log(1 − Xi) log(1 − Xj)1cj=ci 1ij∈E . Thus, G24 is a
WPG and, by Theorem 11, G26 with payoff
u26i(c) := Xi
∏
j∈I
ci
i (c)
(1−Xj). (57)
is an OPG. Chen and Huang [42] further discussed G26 with player-specific constants and proved
that the game is an OPG.
Before concluding this section, we would like to point out the relationship between G24 and
CGs. When we assume an identical transmission probability Xi = X for every i, we get
u24i(c) = log(X) + log(1−X)
∑
j 6=i 1cj=ci 1ij∈E , (58)
i.e., G24 is a CG on graphs.
7There is another simple proof of this based on the fact that G23 is equivalent to G26 when setting Xi = 1 for every i.
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B. Random Backoff
Let the backoff time of player i be denoted by λi ∈ [1, λmax], where λmax represents the
backoff window size. The probability to acquire channel access is given by
u27i(c) := Pr
{
λi < min
j∈I
ci
i
{λj}
}
=
λmax∑
λ=1
1
λmax
(
λmax − λ
λmax
)∑
j 6=i 1cj=ci
. (59)
G27 is a singleton CG, and thus is an EPG. Furthermore, G28 with
u28i(c) := lim
λmax→∞
u27i(c) =
1
1 +
∑
j 6=i 1cj=ci
(60)
is also a singleton CG.
Chen and Huang [40] showed that G27 with player-specific constants is an OPG. They [42]
further discussed G27 and G28 on graphs with player-specific constants, and proved that these
are OPGs according to the proof provided in [120]. Xu et al. [194] further discussed the game
under fading channels.
Chen and Huang [42] generalized G28 to G29, whose payoff function is a generalized through-
put
u29i(c) :=
wi∑
j wj
, (61)
where wi (> 0) represents the channel-sharing weight for player i. Du et al. [53] further discussed
this kind of game.
For the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b), Canales and Ga´llego [26] proposed using the
following network throughput as a result of joint transmission power and channel assignment as
potential: ∑
i
Bci
1 +
∑
j 6=i 1Gijpj>T 1cj=ci
log2
(
1 +
Giipi
N
)
, (62)
where Gij 6= Gji, Bci is the bandwidth of channel ci, and T is the power threshold of interference.
Since (62) is too complex, it may be difficult to derive simple payoff functions. Thus, Canales
and Ga´llego proposed using payoff functions of the form of a WLU (23). Note that the evaluation
of the WLU of (62) requires the impact of joint assignment on the throughput of neighboring
nodes.
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XII. TRANSMISSION PROBABILITY ADJUSTMENT FOR THE MULTIPLE-ACCESS COLLISION
CHANNEL (SLOTTED ALOHA)
Consider a collision channel shared using slotted ALOHA. Each node i adjusts its transmission
probability xi ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the following successful access probability (minus the cost):
u30i(xi,x−i) := xi
∏
j 6=i(1− xj)− costi(xi). (63)
This is a well-known payoff function. Further discussion can be found in [167]. Because (63)
satisfies (8), G30 := (I, ([0, 1]), (u30i)) is an EPG with potential
φ30(x) = −
∏
i(1− xi)−
∑
i costi(xi). (64)
Candogan et al. [30] showed that G30 in stochastic channel model, where each player adjusts
his/her transmission probability based on the channel state, is a WPG. Cohen et al. [45] discussed
a multi-channel version of G30. They also discussed G30 on graphs [46].
For this kind of transmission probability adjustment to satisfy ∑ xi < 1, the cost function
costi(x) = 1
∑
i xi>1
needs to be used [50]. Because this cost function is a coordination function,
a game with this cost function is still an EPG.
XIII. TRANSMISSION POWER ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE THROUGHPUT IN
MULTIPLE-ACCESS CHANNEL
Here, we discuss power control problems in multiple-access channels, as shown in Fig. 1(a),
where each TX attempts to adjust its transmission power level to maximize its throughput. For a
summary of transmission power control, we refer to [43]. Note that Saraydar et al. [153] applied
a game-theoretic approach to an uplink transmission power control problem in a CDMA system.
The relation between potential games and transmission power control to achieve target SINR or
target throughput has been discussed in [133].
Alpcan et al. [7] formulated uplink transmission power control in a single-cell CDMA as the
game G31 := (I, (Pi), (u31i)), where Pi := { pi | 0 < Pi,min ≤ pi ≤ Pi,max }, Pi,min is the
minimum transmission power, and Pi,max is the maximum transmission power. In this game,
each TX i ∈ I adjusts its transmission power pi ∈ Pi to maximize its data rate (throughput),
which is assumed to be proportional to the Shannon capacity, minus the cost of transmission
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power, i.e.,
u31i(pi,p−i) := log
(
1 + S
Gipi
N +
∑
j 6=iGjpj
)
− αipi, (65)
where S (> 1) is the spreading gain and αi is a positive real number. The cost function −αipi is
used to avoid an inefficient Nash equilibrium, where all TXs choose the maximum transmission
power. All TXs choose this power because BR(p−i) is the maximum transmission power for
every TX when the cost function is not used [7], [153].
Alpcan et al. [7] proved the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the game, and
Neel [137, §5.8.3.1] showed that this game is not an EPG because (8) does not hold. Note that
Neel et al. [132] was the first to apply the potential game approach to this type of power control.
Instead of G31, Fattahi and Paganini [60] proposed setting S = 1 in G31, i.e.,
u32i(p) := log
(
1 +
Gipi
N +
∑
j 6=iGjpj
)
− costi(pi) (66)
= log (N +
∑
iGipi)− log
(
N +
∑
j 6=iGjpj
)
− costi(pi),
where costi : Pi → R is a non-decreasing convex cost function. Since u32i(p) is a linear com-
bination of a coordination function log(
∑
iGipi+ σ
2), a dummy function log(
∑
j 6=iGjpj + σ
2),
and a self-motivated function costi(pi), G32 := (I, (Pi), (u32i)) is an EPG with potential
φ32(p) = log (N +
∑
iGipi)−
∑
i costi(pi). (67)
Because φ32(p) is continuously differentiable and strictly concave, by Theorem 3, there is
a unique maximizer for the potential, and best-response dynamics converge to a unique Nash
equilibrium, which is the maximizer of the potential on strategy space
∏
i Pi. Kenan et al. [83]
discussed G32 over time-varying channels.
Neel [137, §5.8.3.1] approximated (65) by
u33i(p) := log
(
S
Gipi
N +
∑
j 6=iGjpj
)
− costi(pi), (68)
and showed that G33 := (I, (Pi), (u33i)) is an EPG with potential φ33(p) =
∑
i(log pi −
costi(pi)). Candogan et al. [31] applied G33 to multi-cell CDMA systems, and verified that the
modified game is an EPG with a unique Nash equilibrium by applying Theorem 3. A more
general form of payoff functions of SINR was discussed in [65].
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A. Multi-channel Systems
A transmission power control game G32 with multiple channels was discussed in [73], [81],
[145]. Let the set of channels be denoted by C. Each TX i ∈ I transmits through a subset of C
to maximize the aggregated capacity
∑
c∈C
log
(
1 +
Gi,cpi,c
Nc +
∑
j 6=iGj,cpj,c
)
(69)
by adjusting the transmission power vector (pi,1, . . . , pi,|C|). This game is an EPG with potential∑
c∈C log (Nc +
∑
iGi,cpi,c). Mertikopoulos et al. [124] further discussed the game under fading
channels. Note that multi-channel transmission power assignment problems can be seen as joint
transmission power and channel assignment problems introduced in Section IX because a zero
transmission power level means that the relevant channel has not been assigned [144].
Note that [145] also discussed BS selection, and further discussion can be found in [75]. The
joint transmission power and bandwidth assignment problem for relay networks was discussed
in [3]. Primary-secondary scenario [49] and heterogeneous network scenario [101], [181], [204]
were also discussed.
B. Precoding
Closely related problems to the power control problems discussed above are found in precoding
schemes for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multiple-access channels. The instantaneous
mutual information of TX i, assuming that multiuser interference can be modeled as a Gaussian
random variable, is expressed as
B log2
∣∣∣IMr + ρH iQiHHi + ρ∑j 6=iH jQjHHj ∣∣∣
−B log2
∣∣∣IMr + ρ∑j 6=iHjQjHHj ∣∣∣ , (70)
where ρ = 1/N , H i ∈ CNr×Nt is the channel matrix, HHi is the Hermitian transpose of H i,
Qi is a covariance matrix of input signal, Mt is the number of antennas at every TX, and Mr
is the number of antennas at a single RX. Belmega et al. [18] discussed a game where an input
covariance matrix Qi is adjusted. Concurrently, Zhong et al. [213] discussed a game where a
precoding matrix is adjusted. Since Qi is calculated from a precoding matrix, these games are
equivalent.
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Since (70) is a coordination-dummy function, this game is an EPG with the system’s achievable
sum-rate as potential. This game was further discussed in [92, Section 8]. Energy efficiency [212],
primary-secondary scenario [214], and relay selection [211] were also discussed. Joint precoding
and AP selection in multi-carrier system was discussed in [111].
XIV. TRANSMISSION POWER ASSIGNMENT MAINTAINING CONNECTIVITY (TOPOLOGY
CONTROL)
The primary goal of topology control [152] is to adjust transmission power to maintain network
connectivity while reducing energy consumption to extend network lifetime and/or reducing
interference to enhance throughput.
Komali et al. [85] formulated the topology control problem in the TX network model shown
in Fig. 1(c) as G34 := (I, (Pi), (u34i)) with Pi = [0, Pi,max] and
u34i(p) := αfi(p)− pi, (71)
where α ≥ maxi{Pi,max}, and fi(p) is the number of TXs with whom TX i establishes (possibly
over multiple hops) a communication path using bidirectional links. Note that fi(p′i,p−i) ≥
fi(pi,p−i) when p′i > pi. This game has been shown to be an OPG with
φ34(p) = α
∑
i
fi(p)−
∑
i
pi. (72)
Note that the mathematical representation of fi(p) using connectivity matrix [201] was first
proposed in [127].
Komali et al. [84] also discussed interference reduction through channel assignment, which is
seen as a combination of G14 and a channel assignment version of G34. They further discussed
the impact of the amount of knowledge regarding the network on the spectral efficiency [86].
Chu and Sethu [44] considered battery-operated stations and formulated transmission power
control to prolong network lifetime while maintaining connectivity as an OPG. Similar ap-
proaches can be found in [69], and the joint assignment of transmission power and channels was
discussed in [70].
Liu et al. [103], [104] formulated measures for transmission power and sensing range adjust-
ment to enhance energy efficiency while maintaining sensor coverage as an OPG.
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XV. FLOW AND CONGESTION CONTROL IN THE FLUID NETWORK MODEL
Bas¸ar et al. [6], [16] formulated a flow and congestion control game, where each user i adjusts
the amount of traffic flow ri to enhance
u35i(r) := αi log(1 + ri)− βri −
1
capacity −
∑
i ri
, (73)
where 1/(capacity −
∑
i ri) represents the commodity-link cost of congestion. Because (73) is
a combination of self-motivated and coordination functions, a game G35 with payoff function
u35i(r) is an EPG [10], [171] with
φ35(r) =
∑
i
(αi log(1 + ri)− βri)−
1
capacity −
∑
i ri
. (74)
The learning process of this game was further discussed by Scutari et al. [155]. Other payoff
functions for flow control were discussed in [58], [100].
XVI. ARRIVAL RATE CONTROL FOR AN M/M/1 QUEUE
Douligeris and Mazumdar [52], and Zhang and Douligeris [205] introduced an M/M/1 queuing
game G36 := (I, (Λi), (u36i)), where each user i transmits packets to a single server at departure
rate µ and adjusts the arrival rate λi to maximize the “power” [113], which is defined as the
throughput λi divided by the delay µ−
∑
i λi, i.e.,
u36i(λ) := λ
αi
i
(
µ−
∑
i
λi
)
, (75)
where αi (> 0) is a factor that controls the trade-off between throughput and delay. Note that
this game is a Cournot game (see (5)) when αi = 1 for every i.
Gai et al. [62] proved that G36 is an OPG. Here, we provide a different proof. Because a
game with payoff function u37i(λ) = αi log(λi) + log (µ−
∑
i λi) is an EPG, by Theorem 11,
(I, (Λi), (exp(u37i))) = (I, (Λi), (u36i)) = G36 is an OPG.
XVII. LOCATION UPDATE FOR MOBILE NODES
A. Connectivity
Marden et al. [115] pointed out that the sensor deployment problem (see [34] and references
therein), where each mobile node i updates its location ri ∈ R2 to forward data from immobile
sources to immobile destinations, can be formulated as an EPG. Since the required transmission
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power to an adjacent node j ∈ Ii is proportional to the square of the propagation distance,
‖ri − ri‖, in a free-space propagation environment, minimizing the total required transmission
power problem is formulated as a maximization problem with global objective
φ38(r) := −
∑
i
∑
j∈Ii
‖ri − rj‖
2
2
. (76)
If
u38i(r) = −
∑
j∈Ii
‖ri − rj‖
2 (77)
is used as the payoff function of node i, G38 := (I, (R2), (u38i)) is equivalent to the consensus
game G8.
B. Coverage
A sensor coverage problem is formulated as a maximization problem with global objective in
continuous form φ39(s) [34]
φ39(s) :=
∫
Ω
R(r)
[
1−
∏
i
(1− ρi(r, si))
]
dr, (78)
or in discrete form [128]
φ40(s) :=
∑
r
R(r)
[
1−
∏
i
(1− ρi(r, si))
]
, (79)
where Ω ⊂ R2 is the specific region to be monitored, R : Ω→ R+ is an event density function
or value function that indicates the probability density of an event occurring at point r ∈ Ω,
ρi : Ω × Ω → [0, 1] is the probability of sensor i to detect an event occurring at r ∈ Ω, and
si ∈ Ω is the location of sensor i. For a summary of coverage problems, we refer the interested
reader to [32], [33].
Arslan et al. [13] discussed a game where each mobile sensor i updates its location si ∈ Ω,
treated φ40(s) as potential, and proposed assigning a WLU to each sensor, i.e.,
u40i(s) =
∑
r
R(r) ρi(r, si)
∏
j 6=i
(1− ρj(r, sj)), (80)
where ρi(r, si)
∏
j 6=i(1 − ρj(r, sj)) corresponds to the probability that sensor i detects an event
occurring at r alone. Further discussion can be found in [115] . We would like to note that
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G40 := (I, (Ω), (u40i)) has a similar expression with G30. In the same manner in G40, Du¨rr et
al. [57] treated φ39(s) as potential and proposed assigning a WLU
u39i(s) =
∫
Ω
R(r) ρi(r, si)
[∏
j 6=i
(1− ρj(r, sj))
]
dr. (81)
Zhu and Martı´nez [215] considered mobile sensors with a directional sensing area. Each
mobile sensor updates its location and direction. The reward from a target is fairly allocated to
sensors covering the target.
Arsie et al. [12] considered a game where each node i attempts to maximize the expected
value of the reward. Here, each node i receives the reward if node i is the first to reach point
r, and the value of the reward is the time until the second node arrives, i.e.,
u41i(s) :=
∫
Ω
R(r)max
{
0,min
j 6=i
‖r − sj‖ − ‖r − si‖
}
dr. (82)
G41 := (I, (Ω), (u41i)) was proved to be an EPG.
XVIII. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE COVERAGE FOR IMMOBILE SENSORS
Ai et al. [2] formulated a time slot assignment problem for immobile sensors, which is
equivalent to a channel allocation problem, as G42 := (I, (Ci), (u42i)), where each sensor i ∈ I
selects a slot ci ∈ Ci := {1, . . . , K} to maximize the area covered only by sensor i, i.e.,
u42i(c) :=
∣∣∣∣Si \⋃ j 6=i
cj=ci
Sj
∣∣∣∣ , (83)
where Si is the sensing area covered by sensor i. Game G42 was proved to be an EPG with
potential
φ42(c) =
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣⋃ i∈I
ci=k
Si
∣∣∣∣ , (84)
where φ(c)/K corresponds to the average coverage.
To show the close relationship between the payoff functions (63) in the slotted ALOHA game
G30 and (81) in the coverage game G39, we provide different expressions. Using ρi(r) := 1r∈Si ,
we get
u42i(c) =
∫
ρi(r)
∏
j 6=i
(1− ρj(r)1cj=ci) dr, (85)
where the surface integral is taken over the whole area. Wang et al. [180] further discussed this
problem.
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Song et al. [164] applied the coverage game to camera networks. Ding et al. [51] discussed a
pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) camera network to track multiple targets. Another potential game-theoretic
PTZ camera control scheme was proposed in [72], motivated by natural environmental moni-
toring. Directional sensors were discussed in [95]. The form of payoff functions is similar to
(80).
Until now, each immobile sensor was assumed to receive a payoff when it covered a target
alone. Yen et al. [197] discussed a game where each sensor receives a payoff when the number
of sensors covering a target is smaller than or equal to the allowable number. Since this game
falls within a class of CGs, it is also an EPG.
XIX. CONCLUSIONS
We have provided a comprehensive survey of potential game approaches to wireless networks,
including channel assignment problems and transmission power assignment problems. Although
there are a variety of payoff functions that have been proven to have potential, there are some
representative forms, e.g., BSI games and congestion games, and we have shown the relations
between representative forms and individual payoff functions. We hope the relations shown in
this paper will provide insights useful in designing wireless technologies.
Other problems that have been formulated in terms of potential games are found in routing
[8], [97], [156], [157], [186], [202], BS/AP selection [98], [99], [112], [161], [172], cooperative
transmissions [4], [139], secrecy rate maximization [11], code design for radar [146], broadcast-
ing [35], spectrum market [87], network coding [116], [147], [148], data cashing [94], social
networks [39], computation offloading [38], localization [79], and demand-side management in
smart grids [77], [183].
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